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The government of General Secretary Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao (2002-
2012) has placed an emphasis on improving the quality of governance and service 
delivery, especially for those who have not benefitted so well from, or who have 
been disadvantaged by the reform program to date. This emphasis is encapsulated 
in populist slogans such as “putting people first” (yiren weiben) and “building a 
harmonious society” (goujian hexie shehui). At a systemic level, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) has declared that it is no longer a “revolutionary” but rather 
a “ruling party” that needs to modernize and adjust its systems of management (CCP 
Central Committee 2005). Reforms have attempted to improve the quality of expert 
and even citizen input into the decision-making process and evaluation of local 
officials, and to improve the functioning of government agencies. Other reforms 
have sought to boost “inner-party democracy” but all measures stop short of 
providing institutionalized mechanisms for feedback and any notion of open, 
competitive politics.  
  Despite these reforms, one could argue that many of China’s core problems 
arise from deficiencies in governance. The system is riddled with corruption, a sure 
sign of poor governance, with officials abusing official position for personal gain and 
with the sale of government positions undermining the notion of promotion based 
on meritocratic principles. Many, if not most, of the local protests are caused by the 
improper or illegal actions of local officials. This includes the poor implementation 
of good national regulation at the local level (leading to environmental pollution or 
sale of substandard products), the illegal transfer of land that dispossesses or 
undercompensates farmers, and restricting access to public goods and services.  
  In comparative terms, China’s indicators are not too bad with the exception 
of “voice and accountability”.  According to the World Bank’s Governance Indicators 
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010 and web access 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp), China’s governing 
performance has not varied significantly since 1996 when the project began. Four of 
the six indicators rank in the 50th to 75th percentile. The exceptions are government 
effectiveness (60.7 in 2011) and voice and accountability (4.7 in 2011). Compared 
with other large developing countries and those with similar income levels, China’s   3 
evaluation is favorable. However, as China strives in economic terms to emulate the 
“tiger economies” of East Asia and others that have escaped the “middle-income 
trap”, China still has a long way to go to improve its governance indicators (see 
Table One). Institutions lag behind economic growth and may become a drag on 
further growth. One could argue, of course, that the causality is unclear and that it is 
the rising incomes that lead to a need for improved governance rather than better 
government performance yielding higher per capita incomes.  
  Despite the lack of formal channels for citizen voice and accountability, 
citizens’ views and popular pressure are increasingly impacting on policy-makers. 
This can range from the pressure of ultra-nationalist groups on and off-line, to the 
rise of protests against local abuses of power to the increased use of social media to 
express views and spread “unofficial” news. Unlike during the pre-reform era, 
citizens are more willing and able to stake claims against the state in order to obtain 
better service from their government. The paternalism of the Maoist state retains a 
strong influence down to the present day but the “infantilization” of society is 
harder to maintain. It is difficult for the current leadership to maintain the view that 
their citizens are children who do not know what is in their best interests. 
Representation has usually meant presuming knowledge of individual and societal 
interest and therefore being empowered to take all important decisions on their 
behalf (Saich, forthcoming). However, increasingly citizens have different 
expectations of their government expecting it to provide them with the necessary 
resources to make better individual choices and to provide effective protection 
against the vicissitudes of the market. 
  The spread of new social media has expanded greatly “voice” for citizens and 
the CCP has invested heavily in policing and shaping the online messages (Yang 
2009 and Fallows 2011). However, new social media provides a major challenge to a 
party that is used to traditional media controls and censorship, with hierarchy of 
information access that provides the basis for the exchange of secrets that can be 
traded for power and wealth. The danger is that a system of information control 
becomes dysfunctional leading to distrust of official media and online rumor is given 
greater credibility (Saich 2006). In our 2011 survey, 65.2 percent of respondents   4 
expressed relative or extreme confidence in news transmitted on Sina Weibo, 
China’s twitter equivalent, only a few percentage points lower than the Edelman 
annual global survey found for the media in China (73 percent, 
trustbarometer2012in fographic.pdf).1 Sina Weibo was also seen by 56.7 percent as 
playing a role in combating corruption in the future and 36.6 percent definitely saw 
it as a medium for exposing corruption when it occurred. A further 46.7 percent 
noted that they might use Weibo to expose a corrupt action. 
  At the present time, these lacunae do not necessarily present insuperable 
problems for the CCP. It does not appear that a majority of citizens see the problems 
as systemic and our surveys suggest that the abuses are seen as local aberration 
rather than the consequence of central policy intent. The Qiu Ju mentality remains 
strong.2 Second, government institutions have been remarkably flexible in 
accommodating new challenges and groups. The Chinese state is a “negotiated” one 
where each entity negotiates space and its relationship to others (see Saich 2000 
and Saich and Hu forthcoming). For those entities that are successful in this 
negotiation, it allows them not only to survive but also often to prosper by using the 
facilities of the state to pursue their own objectives. Of course, some organizations 
are crushed while there is always the fear of state capture by vested interests. This 
has been argued most strongly for the capture of local government by Minxin Pei 
(2006) and recently there has been growing discussion of capture of national 
decision-making by vested interests. This is not necessarily an efficient mechanism 
for governing but it does provide a safety valve and a process for inclusion. 
The main question is whether China’s citizens are sufficiently satisfied to 
reduce potential challenges to CCP rule. It is reasonable to assume that if a 
significant percentage of citizens are more satisfied with government performance 
and the provision of public goods, the government will have a greater capacity for 
policy experimentation and enjoy a residual trust that may help them survive policy 
errors. Various writers have posited the relationship between citizen confidence in 
government and the capacity to implement laws and policies and reduce the need 
for coercion (see Hetherington 1998 and Warren 1999)   5 
This paper asks three sets of questions. The first set asks about the general 
levels of satisfaction with government across different levels. Second, we ask about 
how citizens view the performance of local officials in dealing with the public and in 
implementing policy. Third, we look at the level of satisfaction with the provision of 
a number of specific goods and services, with a more in-depth look at dealing with 
corruption. In particular, it compares responses between those who live in major 
cities, small towns and townships, and villages. The findings are based on a survey 
that was conducted together with Horizon Market Research Company in the fall of 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011. The survey is a purposive stratified survey 
ranging from 3,800 to 4,150 respondents selected from three administrative levels: 
city, town and village (for details see Appendix One). It is not a nationwide 
probability sample but comprises a number of sites selected on the basis of three 
variables: geographic location, average per capita income and population.3  Seven 
cities (eight from 2005) were selected together with seven townships and eight 
villages. Within each of the cities respondents were selected randomly through the 
household registration lists using the KISH method (Kish 1949 and Survey Sampling 
1965). At the township and village levels because of the large average size of 
families, respondents were selected randomly through the closest birthday method. 
In terms of coverage, the surveys exclude two groups. They do not cover the migrant 
populations in the major cities, which make up significant percentages (in 2011, 
35.9 percent of Beijing’s population and 36.4 percent of Shanghai’s), nor do they 
include China’s autonomous regions as these have somewhat different policies for 
public goods provision. However, some data concerning rural migrants drawn from 
the 2008 China Comprehensive Social Conditions Survey (Zhongguo shehui zonghe 
zhuangkuang diaocha) is included below. 
One advantage is that the survey does allow us to compare resident attitudes 
in cities, towns and villages within the sample.4 Since the 1950s when the Chinese 
state created a dual rural-urban society enforced through the household registration 
system (hukou), the two populations have been subject to quite distinct systems for 
the provision of public goods and services with more generous benefits for urban 
residents, especially those who were state sector employees. Reforms have loosened   6 
these divisions rendering urban and rural more integrated than at any time since 
the early 1950s. There has been little research that compares satisfaction across the 
urban-rural divide. Certainly, urban residents receive better service but does this 
lead them to be more satisfied? The uncertainties that reforms have brought and the 
removal of some benefits may have caused a rise in dissatisfaction. By contrast, 
rural inhabitants have experienced a major collapse in collectively provided goods 
and services that the leadership has tried to repair in recent years. Across the board, 
not only does place of household registration matter but also level of income in 
terms of access to important goods such as education and healthcare. With rising 
migration, rural residents have learned more about conditions in the urban areas 
and this might lead to increased frustration with their lot. Are different government 
services perceived differently dependent on whether one lives in a major city, a 
town or the village and does this affect what residents expect from their local 
government? Such questions allow us to speculate on the long-term stability of CCP-
rule as it is reasonable to presume that widespread deep dissatisfaction will 
undermine regime support.5  
 
The Mountains are High and the emperor is far Away: Disaggregating the State 
Rather than contemplating extensive reform of the Leninist system, General 
Secretary Hu has placed emphasis on improving the quality of local officials and 
trying to inspire in them a moral notion of what it means to be a “good communist.” 
This draws on a selective reading of China’s Confucian heritage and its application 
by former head of state Liu Shaoqi (1939), something for which he was roundly 
condemned during the Cultural Revolution. The Hu-Wen leadership has supported 
this by introducing policy measures to provide basic safety nets for Chinese society 
and to integrate migrants into urban services more effectively. 
With respect to general satisfaction levels, there are two main findings. The 
2011 survey confirms those of earlier years that respondents “disaggregate” the 
state and while they express high levels of satisfaction with the Central Government, 
satisfaction declines with each lower level of government. This view is confirmed by 
other surveys that have been conducted (Li and O’Brien 1996, Li 2004 and Li 2012).   7 
Tianjin Shi’s national survey (2001) found that citizens who might be wary of local 
governments may still trust the Central Government. A survey by Zhang Houan and 
his colleagues from Central China Normal University on trust in different levels of 
the party apparatus carried out between 1999 and 2001 shows a similar tendency 
(cited in Li 2012, p. 109),6 as does the China Survey for 2008.7 Our survey shows 
that this trend holds steady throughout the Hu-Wen administration. The findings 
imply that the disaggregation of the state with a benevolent center and an 
obstructionist local authority that many have observed in rural China also applies to 
urban China. 
  In 2011, 91.8 percent of respondents were either relatively or extremely 
satisfied with the work of Central Government (37.3 percent were extremely 
satisfied) but this dropped progressively to 63.8 percent at the local level (10.9 
percent extremely satisfied) (see Table Two). This trend maps fairly closely with 
the China Survey 2008 on trust in leaders at different levels. In 2008, 44.6 percent 
had high level of trust in central leaders (37.3 percent extremely satisfied in our 
2011 survey); 24.3 percent in provincial leaders (28.4 percent in 2011) and 17.1 
percent in county/town leaders (14.6 percent in 2011). The fact that satisfaction 
declines as one gets closer to the people is problematic as local governments 
provide most public services and carry the heaviest financial burden, especially at 
the county and township level. The Maoist slogan of “self-reliance” reinforced the 
idea that each administration should minimize “dependence” on support from 
higher levels of government and this continued throughout the reform era. This has 
resulted in sub-national expenditures of 80 percent as a share of total public 
spending, a very high figure,8 and one that has risen from 52.6 percent when 
reforms began in 1978. This means that local governments are engaged in strategies 
to increase transfers from the central government or the next higher level of 
government or have to find ways to increase their own revenue base to meet their 
obligations. Sub-national levels of government provide 98.9 percent of spending on 
education, 98.4 percent on health, 94 percent on safety nets, and 98 percent on 
environmental protection (http:www.stats.gov.cn/tjs/ndsj/2010/indexeh.htm). Local   8 
government finances in rural areas have become even tighter since the government 
converted all fees into the single agricultural tax in 2002 and then abolished the tax 
entirely in 2006. 
  The county level administration is being developed into the fiscal center for 
the rural areas and it is eclipsing the township. This expansion of responsibility has 
been conducted under the slogan of “taking the county as the lead” (yixian weizhu); 
spending at the county-level now accounts for about one-quarter of all public 
expenditures. Most important was the decision in 2001 to shift the fiscal 
responsibility for teachers’ salaries to the county from the township (People’s Daily, 
June 14, 2001). The number of respondents extremely satisfied with the 
performance of county government is just 14.6 percent, with a further 57.2 
relatively satisfied. In part this may be related to lack of information. For example, 
only 8.2 percent of residents knew the name of the county magistrate.  
The decline in level of satisfaction holds constant no matter where the 
respondent lives. Thus we find the phenomenon of declining satisfaction with 
government performance other scholars have documented throughout rural China, 
holds true for urban China while the rise in dissatisfaction is not so acute. At the 
lowest levels of government, satisfaction was relatively constant with the highest 
level of satisfaction among those living in small towns (68.7 percent extremely or 
relatively satisfied), 63.9 percent for those in major cities and 62 percent in the 
villages (see Table Three). This was a change from previous years where 
satisfaction of those living in the municipalities was the highest.  Those living in the 
villages had the highest response rate for those extremely satisfied with the Central 
Government (45.2 percent), perhaps attesting to recognition of the measures 
introduced by Hu and Wen to improve the lot of rural communities.9 By contrast, 
only 26.6 percent of those living in major municipalities were extremely satisfied 
with the work of the Central Government.  
The second major finding is that, on the whole the level of satisfaction with 
the work of government has risen across the board since the Hu-Wen 
administration began, rising to a peak in 2009 before dropping back slightly in 
2011. A number of factors caused 2009 to represent a peak. The Summer Olympics   9 
and the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic gave the 
government an opportunity to promote its global role and national achievements. 
The national government was also able to use the tragedy of the Wenchuan 
Earthquake to promote a positive view of its role as did its quick response to the 
2008 financial crisis that resulted in a major stimulus package that significantly 
moderated the impact in China. However, by 2011 some of these positive effects had 
worn off and urban residents were affected by high housing prices, and all were 
affected by higher inflation and concerns about things such as food safety.10 The 
poor handling of the July 2011 Wenzhou high-speed rail crash might also have had a 
negative impact. The Edelman Trust barometer showed a drop in 2011 from 88 to 
75 percent.  
Satisfaction with the Central Government has remained consistently high 
(86.1 percent relatively or extremely satisfied in 2003 and 91.8 percent in 2011) 
while for the lowest levels of government it has risen from 43.6 percent to 63.8 
percent. If we rank the responses from four to one for extremely satisfied to 
extremely dissatisfied, then the satisfaction index for Central Government rose from 
3.16 in 2003 to a high of 3.41 in 2009 before dropping back to 3.30 in 2011. For 
township and village government and street committees it has risen consistently 
from 2.32 to 2.71 (see Table Four). The highest and lowest income groups tend to 
be those that are most satisfied. This would suggest that those with the highest 
income feel that they have done well under the current system and thus are 
relatively satisfied with the way that the government does it work. That there is 
higher satisfaction levels among the lowest income group suggests that they see 
central policy intent as being supportive of their interests.  
While the consequences of these findings may raise concerns about the 
quality of local governance, they are not necessarily bad news for the Central 
government. The lower levels of satisfaction might be a potential indicator of social 
instability but the survey suggests that for our sample at least, citizens do not see 
the problems as lying with the Central government. This accords with the findings of 
others that while demonstrations, strikes and unrest may be daily occurrences in 
rural and urban China, the Central government retains a strong source of legitimacy.   10 
Many would appear to see the problem with local policy implementation rather than 
with lack of the Center’s will or systemic bias. In fact, the incentives for local 
governments to follow central directives in areas such as environmental and social 
policy are weak, while there is intense pressure on them to generate revenue often 
through non-sanctioned fees and levies.11 However, this set of perceptions holds out 
the possibility that residents will continue to remonstrate against local officials 
seeing their actions as justified by central policy intent. In addition, the leadership 
can draw some comfort from the fact that satisfaction levels have risen over time. 
The second set of questions turns to look at how citizens view the character of their 
local officials and whose interests they think they serve.  
 
Serving the People or Serving Themselves: Satisfaction with the Performance of Local 
Government and Officials 
Protests against the unjust actions of local agents of the state have become 
commonplace in contemporary China and have reached a wider audience through 
the use of new social media. As noted above, many local protesters appeal to the 
higher levels of government to rectify local abuse and feel that their demands are 
justified under national policy. One might expect that there is a greater chance for 
demonstration and unrest if citizens’ opinions about local officials are negative, 
viewing them as acting in their own interests rather than in those of the people they 
are supposed to serve. To analyze this, we asked two sets of questions. The first 
covers the attitude of local officials and their competency; the second asked in 
whose interests citizens thought officials acted in carrying out their work.  
  Again we see the same two trends with lower evaluation of the quality of 
officials at the local level than at higher levels of government but the general 
assessment rising since 2003 (once more with the peak year being 2009). We asked 
respondents whether they thought the attitude of local officials when implementing 
policy was cool and indifferent or warm and friendly and whether they thought that 
local officials were very knowledgeable (competent) or stupid (incompetent) (see 
Tables Five and Six). In 2011, the view that local officials were very knowledgeable 
was held by 69.4 percent of respondents, up from 50.8 percent in 2003 but down   11 
from a peak of 74.8 percent in 2009. Not surprisingly, the favorable percentage was 
highest for those living in major cities (82.1 percent) dropping to 60.4 percent in the 
towns and townships but rising to 65.6 percent for those living in villages. Similarly, 
there was an increase among those who thought that local officials were 
bureaucratic in nature rather than caring for the people. In the surveys up until 
2005, a majority of respondents felt that local officials were bureaucratic in 
behavior but by 2011, 41.4 percent of respondents had this view as opposed to 46.1 
percent who thought that they cared about people when carrying out their work.  
  The stress on “putting people first” and attempts to encourage local 
governments to be more responsive and take care of those in need seems to be 
having a limited effect. We asked six pairs of questions comparing government 
behavior that corresponded to concern for ordinary people or bureaucratic 
behavior (see Table Seven). Although dissatisfaction remains relatively high and 
satisfaction relatively low all the indicators have improved in this category from 
2003 to 2011. However, it should still cause concern, as irrespective of place of 
residence, large percentages feel that the behavior of local officials is bureaucratic 
rather then being helpful to the concerns of ordinary people. By 2011, the only two 
pairs where a majority for the perception of bureaucratic behavior prevailed were 
for officials trying to get closer to those with money and getting closer to their 
superiors. However, the difference was considerably lower than in 2003. In 2003, all 
the categories had a majority that saw local government and its official behavior as 
bureaucratic and self-serving. These results should not be surprising given the 
results of a survey by Chen Wensheng on the way key township officials allocated 
their time. Of their time, only 2 percent was spent on serving the people, while 22 
percent was spent on receiving higher level officials, 9 percent on economic 
development and 17 percent on family planning.12 
  Perception of the attitude of officials in municipalities was the most favorable. 
In all six categories there were majorities for behavior that could be seen as 
showing concern for ordinary people, whereas in towns and townships and the 
villages, under 50 percent shared this view for all categories. In the villages, only 39 
percent and 38.7 percent respectively thought that the local officials brought   12 
benefits to ordinary people and had the mentality of taking care of ordinary people. 
In fact, in all categories except for bringing benefits to ordinary people, villagers 
ranked the attitude of their local officials the worst. Interestingly, given the 
emphasis on eradicating illegal fees and levies and only raising funds in line with the 
law, support for the view that fees were indeed raised legally dropped in all three 
residencies in 2011 even to below the level of support in 2007. In the municipalities 
only 62 percent held this view down from a high of 70.8 percent in 2009, in the 
towns and townships, it was 47.5 percent down from 64.3 percent and in the 
villages it was 49 percent down from 64.3 percent. There have been widespread 
demonstrations and complaints, especially in rural China about the imposition of 
illegal fees and levies in order for local officials to raise funds to cover their salaries 
and expenses or to fund their often ill-thought out development plans. It would 
appear that despite the attempts to stamp out this behavior the practice still lingers 
and is even prevalent in municipalities and towns.  
  This sets a challenge for the new leadership that will succeed Hu and Wen. 
Despite improvement, the policy attempts to promote the image of the government 
as close to the people and concerned about their needs still has some way to go to be 
translated into practice at the local level. It is not necessarily the case that 
frustration with local government will turn into criticism and disillusionment with 
Central government. However, continued suspicion of local officials’ intent might 
lead to broader dissatisfaction with the Central government if the Center is seen as 
incapable or unwilling to bring local governments into line with policy intention.  
 
What Quality Services do Citizens Expect Their Government to Provide? 
The last set of questions deals with the kinds of services that citizens want local 
government to provide and their satisfaction with the quality service provision. As 
noted above, it is the local government that is the main provider of goods and 
services in both urban and rural China. In particular, since the abolition of 
agricultural taxes, there has been considerable attention paid to the continued role 
of township administrations with policy attempting to transform them from 
extractive to “service-oriented” agencies. However, the result of various reforms has   13 
been to “hollow-out” township administrations leaving much of the service 
provision to the county/district or the village in the rural areas.13 
  One important legacy of the Maoist years was the notion of “self-reliance” 
meaning that local levels of administration should minimize its dependence on 
higher levels of government. Subsequent tax-sharing reforms in 1993-94 and the 
abolition of the agricultural tax in 2006 have added to the fiscal pressure on local 
governments that still carry the greatest burden for financing infrastructure and 
providing social welfare. Consequently, a major imperative for local governments is 
to raise revenues either by seeking transfers from above, hence the large budget for 
wining and dining,14 or by extracting finances from the community, hence the large 
number of protests and demonstrations.  
  An added burden for local governments has been the new mandates from the 
Central government to expand pension schemes and the minimum living support 
schemes, provide free rural elementary education, and to integrate migrants into 
urban support schemes. These are laudable goals but these mandates are only 
partially supported by central transfers and the burden on local governments have 
meant that, on occasion, services have actually been cut or officials have sought 
ways to deflect the full impact of the policies. In the countryside, policy has been to 
merge or cut the number of townships and since 1985 the number has halved. 
However, these mergers have led to the elimination of accessible services since the 
schools and clinics may be closed in those townships that lose their administrative 
status. This is a particular problem where the distances are large and populations 
are scattered, such as in Tibet. In addition, the county still assigns each township a 
tax quota thus often compounding misguided development strategies that put 
pressure on them to develop the non-agricultural economy. Calculations vary but it 
is clear that township debt is significant. More recently, reforms have included 
county management of township finances and also direct provincial management of 
county financial management (sheng guan xian). The intention is to reduce fiscal 
management from five levels of government to three.15 
  To date, the main approaches for dealing with inadequate revenues have 
been two-fold. The World Bank and the Chinese government have proposed   14 
improving the revenue stream and thinking about better mechanisms for financial 
redistribution. Second, there have been a number of proposals for restructuring 
township government and shifting the financial center in the countryside to the 
county. In addition to the mergers noted above, there have been experiments to 
consolidate all the agencies into three to five service centers and transform the non-
social service agencies into market-oriented enterprises with services outsourced to 
them. The management of these agencies could then be assigned to the county level 
government. It is hope that such reforms would move township government out of 
extensive engagement and interference in farmers’ lives and allow them to 
concentrate on providing public goods and maintaining public order.16 
  This supports the view that there needs to be a thorough re-think of the role 
of government in providing services and what kinds of partnerships can be formed 
to meet policy objectives. A better understanding of how citizens view government, 
what kind of services they expect and how they prioritize them will help clarify 
thinking about this changing role of government. Rather than focusing exclusively 
on the supply side, it would be beneficial to consider the demand side, more 
specifically what citizens think about the provision of specific public goods by local 
government and how they prioritize different needs.  
  The questions relating to satisfaction with the provision of specific public 
services reveal some interesting insights that are helpful for thinking about what 
local government could concentrate on to improve satisfaction levels. Generally, 
there has not been significant variation in terms of those services that the 
respondents were most satisfied with and those with which they expressed the 
greatest dissatisfaction. We ranked the responses from four as extremely satisfied to 
one for extremely dissatisfied. The overall satisfaction index has risen from 2.54 to 
2.82 in 2011 but it has dropped below the levels of 2009 and 2007. It is also worth 
noticing that across all categories for all the years, only nine services have received 
a satisfaction rating of three or above.17 Water and electricity provision (3.09) 
topped the satisfaction list in 2011, displacing family planning (3.05) that had been 
the top service in each previous survey going back to 2003. The fact that family 
planning regularly receives the highest rating requires further investigation. When   15 
follow-up questions were asked, respondents said that they knew it was a Central 
government priority and that there was no point in being critical of the service. 
However, as we shall see below they did not think that it was an important area of 
work for the government to be engaged in. 
The other three categories of work that citizens were most satisfied with 
were: road and bridge construction (2.93), the practice of religious belief (2.92), and 
the management of elementary and secondary schools (2.92). When we followed up 
to ask about satisfaction with government policy on religious belief, especially in 
major cities, it appeared that high satisfaction levels had more to do with the fact 
that it was not important to most people and thus they were relatively satisfied. 
These services tend to be ones that the old planning system was good at delivering 
and monitoring but do not relate to the new challenges brought about by reforms. 
There was some variation depending on where one lived but the top two in all 
places of residence were the same: water and electricity provision and family 
planning (see Table Eight). In villages, medical insurance was placed fifth, 
presumably reflecting the expansion of the new cooperative health insurance 
scheme that the Hu-Wen leadership has pushed.  
The five areas of public goods provision that the respondents were the least 
satisfied with in 2011 were: combatting corruption (2.37), unemployment insurance 
(2.65), employment creation (2.67), helping families in hardship (2.69), and land 
management (2.74). By contrast, these are all needs or problems that have been 
created by the negative impacts of the reform program and for the most part are 
very much household based (see Table Nine). Combatting corruption has always 
been the area of government work that caused most citizen dissatisfaction and in 
2003, employment creation, unemployment insurance and helping families in 
hardship were also in the bottom five. There was some variation depending on place 
of residence. While combatting corruption ranked worst irrespective of residency 
and employment creation, helping families in hardship and unemployment 
insurance featured across all locales, land management was cited in the cities, tax 
management in the towns and the attraction of commerce and capital in the villages.    16 
Li Peilin (2010) provides some data for comparison based on the China 
Comprehensive Survey of Social Conditions. He reports on migrant workers 
satisfaction with a number of public services provided by local government that 
allow broad comparison with our findings. Overall, in 2008 migrants were slightly 
less satisfied with public service provision (58.4 percent relatively or extremely 
satisfied) than with workers in small towns (59.8 percent) and villagers (62.7 
percent). This marked a shift from the 2006 survey when migrant workers’ 
satisfaction was higher. The services in 2008 that they were least satisfied with 
were: the provision of cheap rentals and economically suitable housing for middle 
and lower income individuals (46.1 percent), environmental protection and 
pollution control (46.5 percent) and honesty when performing official duties and 
combatting corruption (48.1 percent). Satisfaction with environmental protection 
saw a significant drop from 57.5 percent in 2006. Those public services that 
received the most favorable ratings were: the provision of quality basic education 
(75.5 percent), good provision of medical and health services (70.1 percent) and 
cracking down on criminal activity and the maintenance of social order (64.6 
percent). Provision of medical services saw a rise from 59.3 percent in 2006.  
To analyze our survey results further we designed a simple matrix that 
correlated the level of importance citizens attached to certain services with the level 
of satisfaction with local government service provision. This is an attempt to 
understand those areas of government service citizens approved of and which 
frustrated them. The five areas of work that citizens felt government should pay 
most attention to were: combatting corruption (3.43), medical insurance (3.43), 
social order (3.36), unemployment insurance (3.32) and employment creation (3.3). 
The five areas that citizens felt deserved the least government attention were: 
religious belief (2.84), family planning (3.12), attracting business and investment 
(3.14), tax management (3.15), and cultural and educational facilities (3.15). Again 
we see a correlation between citizens wanting government to pay attention to 
services that are related to the impact of reforms and do not see a strong role for 
government in overseeing religious belief, family planning and for governments to 
be involved in attracting business and investment.    17 
Thus, when we apply the matrix we get a list that is much more closely 
related to the social and economic problems faced by households that are a result of 
the reform program. In 2011, areas identified where government work is 
unsatisfactory and that urgently need more attention are: combatting corruption, 
unemployment insurance, employment creation, helping families in hardship, 
medical insurance, environmental management, environmental health, land 
management, drugs and medical services, and traffic management (see Table Ten).  
Since the surveys began environmental concerns have risen up the agenda for 
respondents. Those services that respondents feel are important and where the 
government pays sufficient attention are: social order, water and electricity 
provision, road and bridge construction and middle and elementary school 
management. It is noticeable that family planning and religious belief fall in the 
quadrant where respondents feel that government do not need to pay too much 
attention to it.  
The general trends are the same but there is some interesting variation 
between the views of those living in cities, towns and villages. All see combatting 
corruption and employment creation as important and not receiving enough 
attention from government. The most satisfied with government service would 
appear to be those living in the villages as nine of the services fall in the category of 
high importance and high satisfaction, whereas for those in cities only one does so 
(water and electricity provision). Not surprisingly, land management is an area of 
work that villagers want government to pay more attention to.  Those living in the 
cities would appear either to have more gripes or expect better service delivery as 
they identify no less than fifteen services as being important and requiring greater 
government attention. By contrast, those in towns and villages only identify five. 
The healthcare reforms seem to have had an impact in the villages as this is now 
seen as a service that is important but that the government is paying attention to, 
unlike in previous surveys. 
Concern with corruption is clearly a major problem for all categories of 
respondents. It is worth looking at in more detail as high levels of corruption are a 
problem of governance and a symptom that something has gone wrong in the   18 
management of the state. Given the regular exposure in the press of spectacular 
cases of corruption it is not surprising that this is a major concern. It is also a 
phenomenon that eats its way into everyday life as citizens have to pay for access to 
goods and services that the government should be providing. The pursuit of 
economic riches without genuine marketization and democratization and where 
power remains hierarchically structured with information dependent on position 
and party membership lies behind the corrupt activities of government officials. In 
our 2011 survey, only 2.6 percent thought that government and its officials were 
extremely honest (up from 1.2 percent in 2007), while 8.4 percent thought them 
extremely dishonest (up from 5.2 percent in 2007) (see Table Eleven). The feeling 
that government and officials are relatively or extremely honest was higher for 
those in cities (42 percent) than in towns (29 percent) or villages (33.9 percent). All 
of those showed a considerable decline from 2009. Low-income families had the 
most negative view of government honesty. The main causes of corrupt activity 
identified by respondents were with economic management (40.3 percent), 
construction projects (29 percent), within public security and justice systems (29 
percent) and financial and commercial circles (28.3 percent). The least corrupt 
areas of work were seen to be the armed police and military (2.6 percent) and 
telecommunications (2.4 percent). Most respondents would probably have little 
contact with the armed police or the military.  
Given the attitude of respondents, it is not surprising that they are 
pessimistic about the government’s capability to deal with corruption. 38.2 percent 
felt that government work and dedication to eradicating corruption was relatively 
small or extremely small (an increase of 10.3 percent over 2009). There is a greater 
sense among city dwellers that government is dedicated to combatting corruption 
(62.5 percent) and less so in the villages (54 percent). Only 3.1 percent of 
respondents thought that government work to combat corruption was extremely 
effective (a further 32.4 percent thought it was relatively strong). Again the 
impression is worse in villages than in the cities. In the villages only 2.3 percent 
thought the work was extremely strong and 5.2 percent in the cities and 2.4 percent 
in the towns. Last but not least, only 6.4 percent of respondents had a strong belief   19 
that government work to improve corruption would improve and only 57.4 percent 
had some belief.  
 
Concluding Comments 
The new leadership that will take power through late-2012 and 2013 will inherit a 
mixed situation. There is clearly much dissatisfaction with the performance of local 
government and its officials and very few have faith that the government can deal 
effectively with the problem of corruption. Yet, there is still good will towards the 
Central government that is not identified with the problems that are seen to blight 
the performance of those levels of government closer to the people. The surveys 
confirm the view of others that Chinese citizens do “disaggregate” the state and 
would appear to retain faith in the central government. In addition, the satisfaction 
with all levels of government has risen since we began the surveys in 2003. This 
may give the Central leadership some cushion if it makes policy errors in the future. 
However, as we have seen in the recent past seemingly stable authoritarian regimes 
can unravel quickly and citizen frustration can spill out onto the streets. Recently in 
China this frustration has been restricted to protests against local abuses of power.  
  Despite improving indicators, there remain substantial percentages of 
respondents who view the behavior of local officials as bureaucratic and self-
centered. They clearly do not feel that the slogan of “putting people first” has 
become the modus operandi for local officials. Neither do respondents have much 
faith that the government can cure the problems of corruption and they feel that 
their work in this area is ineffective. What is also clear is that citizens want 
government to help resolve the challenges that have arisen during the transition to a 
more market-influenced economy. Rather than supporting blanket services, they 
seem most concerned that government help with the household-based socio-
economic challenges such as employment creation and unemployment insurance. 
  It will be interesting to see whether the new leadership will continue the 
approach of Hu and Wen in rejecting substantive political reform in favor of 
marginal improvements to make the current system function more effectively. As 
noted, our survey suggests that citizens feel that local officials are not very effective   20 
in promoting the interests of ordinary folk but are quite adept at pursuing their own 
interests and sucking up to those with money and power. It will be a significant 
challenge for the new leadership to bring about significant improvement in those 
areas of public service citizens deem most important without increasing 
transparency and accountability in local government.  
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Appendix One: The Surveys1 
The findings and analysis of the survey are based on the results of a purposive 
stratified survey of between 3,800 and 4,100 (3,850 in 2001). Respondents, aged 
between 16 and 60, were selected from three administrative levels: city, town, and 
village. The respondents were aged between 18 and 60 in the cities and town and 18 
and 60 in the villages. At the city level, eight sites were chosen based on their 
geographic location, average per capita income, and population.2 The sites varied in 
all three variables, representing lower-middle income, middle income, and upper 
income individuals, as well as western, eastern, northern and southern populations 
of China. Within the cities respondents were randomly selected through the 
household registration lists using the KISH method.3 At the town and village levels 
because of the large average size of families, respondents were selected randomly 
through the closest birthday method.  No fewer than 250, 150, and 100 respondents 
were identified for each city (2000 total), town (1050 total), and village (800 total), 
respectively. Consequently, the sample has an urban bias, resulting in respondents 
with higher age ranges and, in some cases, higher income levels than the 
corresponding regional averages. In the analysis stage, the results were weighted to 
compensate for both urban bias and relative population size. Thus, for cities, the 
final weight for cities in terms of weighting for urban was 0.5008 while that for the 
villages was 2.6487. With the exception of those in the age range of 16 to 19, the 
demographic profile mirrors reasonably well the national range.   
The survey forms contained around 50 questions, with slight distinctions for 
the rural and urban to address minor discrepancies in income measurements and 
employment responses. Interviewers recorded multiple choice, binary, and free-
response answers.  Care was taken to record respondent demographic data when 
                                                        
1 Unless otherwise stated the details for all the surveys are the same. All surveys 
were conducted in the Fall. 
2 In 2003 and 2004 only seven cities were included but in 2005 Nantong was added. 
3 Household area sampling according to a ‘face sheet’ or table with fractional 
representation of each adult Kish (1949). 
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available, such as profession, gender, age, household registration, educational 
attainment, employment status, private/public enterprise or NGO employee, income 
range, etc. Professional staff trained and employed by Horizon Research Group 
conducted all interviews. The response rate was around 80 percent for each year. 
The sample, by design, does not include migrants or the majority of ethnic 
minorities living in China. Using the household registration system does not capture 
migrant communities. Also, the purpose of this article is to compare the levels of 
satisfaction with local government and certain public goods and services of those 
living in urban and rural China. In some cases, migrants lack legal access to public 
goods and services and their responses therefore create bias in the survey findings. 
Similarly, ethnic minorities residing in autonomous regions live under varying 
policy frameworks, rendering a comparison of government performance between 
regions difficult at best and misleading at worst.    
The questionnaire was conducted in the two Municipalities of Beijing and 
Shanghai and the five cities of Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chengdu, Shenyang and Xi’an, 
with Nantong (Jiangsu) added in 2005. Seven small towns (county level cities) were 
covered: Zhuji in Shaoxing (Zhejiang, village--Fengqiao), Changle in Fuzhou (Fujian, 
village--Changxian), Beining in Jinzhou (Liaoning, village--Zhongan), Xinji in 
Shijiazhuang (Hebei, village--Xinji), Linxiang in Yueyang (Hunan, village--Zhanqiao), 
Pengzhou in Chengdu (Sichuan, village—Li’an), and Xingping in Xianyang (Shaanxi, 
viallage--Pan). In addition, the village of Feng Shuling under the jurisdiction of 
Wuhan (Hubei) was selected to make eight villages in total.  
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Endnotes 
                                                        
1 Personal observation would suggest lower confidence in official media but 
admittedly this is among educated elites in major cities. 
 
2 This is Zhang Yimou’s 1992 movie that traces the attempts by a woman to seek 
redress of grievance for herself and her husband. Having been mistreated by the 
village head, she moves to ever higher levels of government to seek retribution for 
local abuse, all to no avail.  
 
3 For the limitations and uses of non-random samples in the context of China see 
Melanie Manion 1994. Manion demonstrates how much can be gleaned about a 
larger Chinese population from surveys that sample in non-randomly selected 
localities. In particular, one can use such surveys to discuss relationships between 
variables. However, it should be noted that the descriptive results do not permit 
generalizations to be made about the population of China as a whole. For further 
details on the methodology of this survey see Appendix One.  
 
4 On rural China see, for example, Lianjiang Li (2004), for urban China see Jie Chen 
(2004). For the levels of trust in government see Lianjiang Li (2011 and 2012). 
Earlier articles that have drawn on the surveys include Saich 2007, 2011a and 
2011b) 
 
5 Chen (2004) in his study of Beijing drawing on three surveys from 1995 to 1999 
uses David Easton’s distinction between diffuse and specific support. He finds that 
diffuse support was moderately high, although it had declined over the period. This 
implies that the system still enjoys a basic legitimacy. By contrast, specific support 
in terms of evaluation of particular policy areas was low. Our sample survey allows 
us to look at the area of specific support for government performance in general and 
with respect to the provision of certain particular public goods.  
 
6 Of the respondents, 80.7 percent had a very high or relatively high level of trust in 
the Party central committee but only 35.2 percent had the same trust in the village 
party branch and 53.1 in the party committee at the county level.  
 
7 This asks about the degree of trust in leaders at three different levels (central, 
provincial and county or town). Those with extreme or relative trust in the leaders 
amounted to 85.1 percent of respondents for central leaders but only 67.1 percent 
for leaders from the county and town level (cited in Li 2012, p. 110).  
 
8 The figure for 2009 is from http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjs/ndj/2010/indexeh.htm. 
This figure has been rising in recent years despite Hu Jintao’s and Wen Jiabao’s 
increase in government support for welfare and education in the countryside as 
much of the obligation falls on local governments. This percentage is higher than   27 
                                                                                                                                                                     
other countries in the region: for example in Vietnam it is 48 percent, Indonesia 32 
percent, and Thailand 10 percent (Mountfield and Wong, 2005, p. 86). 
 
9 The leadership under Hu and Wen recognized that some of the problems of social 
development would not be solved by growth alone. This realization led to the 
development of a more coherent policy framework based on identification of 
vulnerable groups that were then provided with targeted support. Policy began to 
shift from the provision of short-term safety nets to developing a more integrated, 
comprehensive system. Policy sought to provide greater guarantees to China’s rural 
population and to integrate the growing numbers of migrants into welfare 
structures away from their homes. Thus, since 2002, experimentation with rural 
pensions was stepped up, since 2003 there has been a major push to extend 
coverage of the rural cooperative medical insurance; in 2006 agricultural taxes were 
finally abolished; in 2007 rural residents no longer were required to pay 
miscellaneous school fees and free compulsory education was introduced for rural 
children; and in 2007 the leadership pledged to extend minimum living support 
payments across rural China. For details see Saich 2008. 
 
10 A survey by Tsinghua University and Xiaokang magazine on trust in government 
also showed a rising trend. While the level of trust had been 60.5 percent in 2006, it 
had risen to 67.8 percent in 2012. In contrast with our survey, it shows trust rising 
each year. Evans 2012. 
 
11 On the issue of incentives for local governments see Saich 2002.   
 
12 In addition, 32 percent was spent on meetings and 15 percent on work evaluation. 
Chen Wensheng 2010.  
 
13 For an excellent article looking at this trend see Smith 2010. 
 
14 Zhao Shukai estimates that township leaders spent an average of 100 to 150 days 
per year on receiving other officials and that the cost of “karaoke singing, sauna 
sessions and mahjong” accounted for some 5 to 10 percent of the township’s fiscal 
income. Zhao 20007.  
 
15 John Q. Tian 2009.   
 
16 It is not surprising that in our 2005 survey when we asked whether there were 
too many government agencies, 61 percent of villagers said that they should be 
reduced. Fully 87 percent of respondents in the urban areas said that the number of 
officials should be cut. The preference was to cut those agencies that were seen as 
most intrusive in citizens’ lives and those that they had little knowledge about.  
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17 These were family planning from 2005 to 2011, water and electricity provision 


















































































































































































































































































City   Small Town  Village 
Number  %  Number  %  Number  % 
Extremely Dissatisfied  69  5.8%  37  4.9%  152  6.8% 
Relatively Dissatisfied  332  27.9%  172  23.0%  617  27.7% 
Relatively Satisfied  640  53.7%  439  58.4%  1,127  50.6% 
Extremely satisfied  122  10.2%  78  10.3%  254  11.4% 
No Answer  2  0.1%  1  0.1%  3  0.1% 
Unclear  27  2.3%  25  3.3%  74  3.3% 
 
Source: Author’s survey 2011 
 
    
 
 
Table Four: Citizens’ Satisfaction Level With Government Work 2003 to 2011 
 
  
Government Level  Satisfacion  2003  2004  2005  2007  2009  2011 
Central  
Level  3.16  3.11  3.11  3.32  3.41  3.30 
Change  ----  -2%  0%  7%  3%  -3% 
Provincial or equivalent 
Level  2.89  2.97  3.01  3.18  3.23  3.15 
Change  ----  3%  1%  6%  2%  -2% 
District or County 
Level  2.54  2.72  2.76  2.89  2.88  2.86 
Change  ----  7%  1%  5%  0%  -1% 
Village/Township or Sub-District Office 
Level  2.32  2.57  2.6  2.65  2.65  2.71 
Change  ----  11%  1%  2%  0%  2% 
 
Source: Author’s surveys 2003-2011 
 
    
 
 
Table Five: Citizens’ Assessment of the Character of Local Government and Their Subordinate Agencies When Executing Policy 
 
  2003  2004  2005  2007  2009  2011 
Warm/Friendly  39.1  37.2  47.2  62.4  60.1  61.1 
Cool/Indifferent  38.9  37.9  32.1  26.7  28.7  26.4 
No response  1.3  1.1  0.9  1.7  3.3  2 
Unclear  20.7  23.8  19.8  9.2  7.8  10.5 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Competent  50.8  47.5  59.6  69.3  74.8  69.4 
Incompetent  21.5  21.7  14.4  16.7  9.2  15.4 
No response  1.8  1.6  1.4  2.0  4.6  2.9 
Unclear  26.0  29.2  24.5  12.1  11.4  12.3 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Source: Authors’ surveys 2003-2011 
 
    
 
 
Table Six: Citizens’ Assessment of the Character of Local Government and Their Subordinate Agencies When Executing Policy 
By Place of Residence 
 
 
Cities  Small Towns  Villages 
2005  2007  2009  2011  2005  2007  2009  2011  2005  2007  2009  2011 
Warm  60.7  72.2  73.3  72.0  40.2  59.8  60.7  52.0  43.6  59.4  54.1  58.3 
Cold  23.8  22.4  21  20.7  31.1  33.5  30.1  34.3  35.4  26.9  31.6  26.9 
No response  1.2  1.3  2.5  1.0  1．0  1.1  3.7  2.5  0.8  1.9  3.6  2.3 
Unclear  14.3  4.1  3.3  6.4  27.6  5.6  5.5  11.2  20.2  11.8  10.7  12.5 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Competent  72.5  82.3  83.6  82.1  53.2  75.6  75.4  60.4  56.3  63.0  70.7  65.6 
Incompetent  9.9  11.2  10.8  11.2  13.1  11.1  9.7  25.9  16.4  20.0  8.3  14.2 
No response  1.9  1.3  1.8  2.1  2.0  2.3  4.8  4.0  1.1  2.2  5.8  2.9 
Unclear  16.0  5.2  3.8  4.6  31.7  11.0  10.1  9.7  26.2  14.8  15.2  17.4 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Source: Authors’ survey 2003-2011 
 
    
 
 





Behavior   
Concern for  
Ordinary People 
  2003  2009  2011    2003  2009  2011 
Stand high 
above the people 
48.2  39.4  42.2  Method of 
helping ordinary 
people 
30.9  46.8  47.3 
Close to those 
with money 
50.1  43.9  44.6  Care about 
ordinary people 
with hardships 
28.1  44.2  44.0 
Move close to 
superior leaders 
54.0  49.4  45.8  Have the idea of 
taking care of 
ordinary people 
24.5  39.4  43.0 
Act in Line with 
Slogans 
51.2  37.4  42.5  Resolve real 
problems 




care of own 
interests 
49.8  40.3  41.6  Bring benefits to 
ordinary people 
23.7  45.6  42.5 
Arbitrarily 
collect fees 
41.3  17.6  31.6  Collect fees in 
accordance with 
the law 
31.7  65.9  52.4 
 
Source: Author’s survey 2003-2011 
 
    
 
 
Table Eight: Top Five Pubic Services Ratings According to Place of Residence, 2011 
 
Cities  Small Towns  Villages 
Public Service  Rating  Public Service  Rating  Public Service  Rating 
Water and electricity supply  3.14   Water and electricity supply  3.00   Water and electricity supply  3.09  
Family planning  3.07   Family planning  2.99   Family planning  3.06  
Road and bridge construction  2.98   Middle/elementary school man.  2.97   Social order  2.98  
Religious belief  2.96   Road and bridge construction  2.94   Middle/elementary school man.  2.95  
Cultural/educational facilities  2.93   Cultural/educational facilities  2.94   Medial insurance  2.94  
 
Source: Author’s survey 2011 
 
    
 
 
Table Nine: Lowest Ranked Public Services According to Place of Residence, 2011 
 
Cities  Small Towns  Villages 
Public Service  Rating  Public Service  Rating  Public Service  Rating 
Help for hardship families  2.73   Tax management  2.78   Attraction of commerce and capital  2.68  
Employment creation  2.70   Help for hardship families  2.70   Help for hardship families  2.67  
Unemployment insurance  2.69   Unemployment insurance  2.67   Employment creation  2.66  
Land management  2.68   Employment creation  2.65   Unemployment insurance  2.63  
Combatting corruption  2.44   Combatting corruption  2.30   Combatting corruption  2.35  
 
Source: Author’s survey 2011 
 
    
 
 




Source: Author’s survey 2011 
Unemp ins = unemployment insurance; unemp cre = unemployment creation; med ins = medical insurance; en gov = 
environmental governance; en health = environmental health; school man = middle and elementary school management; wat 


































land man = land management; traf man = traffic management; bridge/road = bridge and road construction; traf man =traffic 
management; cult/educ =cultural and educational facilities; commerce attract = attraction of commerce and investment. 
    
 
 
Table Eleven: Citizens’ Evaluation of the Honesty of Government and Government Officials 
 
  2007  2009  2011 
Extremely dishonest  5.2  6.0  8.4 
Not too dishonest  41.6  42.8  46.8 
Relatively honest  40.1  41.2  32.8 
Extremely honest  1.2  1.5  2.6 
No response  0.9  0.8  0.6 
Unclear  11.1  7.8  8.8 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
Source: Author’s surveys 2007-2011 